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Abstract 
Much of personality research attempts to identify causal links between personality traits and various 
types of outcomes. I argue that causal interpretations require traits to be seen as existentially and 
holistically real and the associations to be independent of specific ways of operationalizing the 
traits. Among other things, this means that, to the extents that causality is to be ascribed to such 
holistic traits, items and facets of those traits should be similarly associated with specific outcomes, 
except for variability in the degrees to which they reflect the traits (i.e., factor loadings). I argue 
that, before drawing causal inferences about personality trait-outcome associations, presence of this 
condition should be routinely tested by, for example, systematically comparing the outcome 
associations of individual items or facets, or sampling different indicators for measuring the same 
purported traits. Existing evidence suggests that observed associations between personality traits 
and outcomes at least sometimes depend on which particular items or facets have been included in 
trait operationalizations, calling trait-level causal interpretations into question. However, this has 
rarely been considered in the literature. I argue that when outcome associations are specific to 
facets, they should not be generalized to traits. Furthermore, when the associations are specific to 
particular items, they should not even be generalized to facets.  
 
Keywords: outcomes; facets; five-factor model; causality; ontology; realism 
Personality traits and outcomes   3 
Psychologists routinely define and operationalize personality as a limited set of broad traits, 
each of which summarizes a wide range of thoughts, feelings and behaviors. As personality 
psychologists, we are interested in the internal structures and inter-relations of such traits, their 
genetic and environmental antecedents, developmental trends, neuroanatomical and physiological 
correlates, as well as their distributions across demographic groups, geographic locations and 
cultures. Here, I focus on another major line of research: the associations of these traits with various 
variables that presumably reflect something outside the domain of personality, to which I 
collectively refer as outcomes. These phenomena are often hypothesized to be partly caused by 
personality traits. Whether and when such causal interpretations are justified is the focus of this 
article. 
Personality traits 
Among the broad personality trait taxonomies, I focus on the Five-Factor Model (FFM; 
McCrae & John, 1992) or Big Five (Goldberg, 1990) traits: Emotional Stability or Neuroticism, 
Extraversion, Openness to Experience or Intellect, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. This is 
not because I believe that these particular traits as commonly defined and operationalized 
necessarily define personality ‘as nature does’. These broad traits just happen to comprise the 
currently most popular and perhaps best-studied trait taxonomy, and studies linking personality 
characteristics to outcomes seem to have followed this trend. However, most of what I discuss 
equally applies to other broad trait taxonomies such as the PEN (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985), MPQ 
(Tellegen & Waller, 2008) or HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2007) models. 
Outcomes 
Broad personality traits are often linked to broad outcomes of particular social or personal 
importance, such as educational, occupational and marital success, health, happiness, and longevity 
(Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 2006; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). What these 
outcomes share is that, despite being quantified along one or a few dimensions, they are all complex 
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phenomena themselves. Besides factors that are generally considered unrelated to personality (e.g., 
parental education or country of birth), they likely reflect the cumulative and transactive effects of 
multiple behavioral choices that people make over long periods of time. This provides reasons to 
expect widespread links with personality trait scores, which also encompass wide ranges of 
behaviors, thoughts and feelings. Other types of outcomes refer to a variety of more specific 
behaviors such as volunteering (Carlo, Okun, Knight, & de Guzman, 2005), mate poaching (Schmitt 
& Shackelford, 2008), residential mobility (Jokela, 2009), eating habits (Mõttus, McNeill, et al., 
2013), smoking and drinking (Malouff, Thorsteinsson, Rooke, & Schutte, 2007; Malouff, 
Thorsteinsson, & Schutte, 2006), physical activity (Rhodes & Smith, 2006) or voting choices 
(Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006), to name just a few.  
Why do we care? 
Broadly speaking, there are at least two reasons that researchers are interested in linking 
personality trait scores to outcomes. The first reason is to "empower" traits by demonstrating that 
they have important consequences (Roberts et al., 2007). The fact that personality trait scores are 
correlated with various types of outcomes is sometimes considered the main reason for interest in 
them (Goldberg, 1999; Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 2006). For example, an association between high 
scores on a personality trait measure and longevity may underscore the importance of studying the 
trait. The other main reason is to explain the variability in these outcomes. Among other things, it 
may be hoped that such associations, if sufficiently understood, can be put to practical use. For 
example, researchers may link personality traits to specific health conditions such as obesity or 
diabetes in the hope of understanding their risk factors, etiology or recurrence and thereby being 
able to devise better interventions or treatments for them (Deary, Weiss, & Batty, 2010).  
How are trait-outcome associations interpreted? 
Both of these motivations seem to require trait-outcome associations to be interpreted in 
causal terms. After all, particular personality traits such as Extraversion or Conscientiousness can 
Personality traits and outcomes   5 
have consequences or provide explanations for phenomena only if they make causal contributions 
to them, at least probabilistically—in some people and/or in some circumstances. Although 
researchers are often careful to acknowledge explicitly that their study designs do not warrant causal 
inference, implicitly their interpretations often rely on it. For example, it has been suggested that 
increasing people’s Conscientiousness might in principle help to increase their longevity, similarly 
to the effects of smoking reduction or increase in physical activity (Jokela et al., 2013). This 
suggestion, in fact coupled with a hypothetical point-estimate of mortality rate reduction, clearly 
entails the assumption that there are processes that, at least in some people and in some 
circumstances, link low Conscientiousness with exposure to more proximal contributors to death.  
Here are some further examples of how researchers have proposed tentative causal 
interpretations, even though these are often qualified by alternative explanations or phrased 
cautiously. Mõttus and colleagues (2013) discussed Openness as being “causal to healthy diet” (p. 
358), although they also acknowledged the possibilities of causality running in the other direction or 
the correlation being spurious due to unmeasured variables. Malouff and colleagues (2007) 
suggested "causal links" (p. 277, 291) between personality traits and alcohol use, although 
admitting in another paragraph that the reviewed studies "do not provide the needed evidence to 
reach causal conclusions" (p. 291). In a similar vein, Roberts and colleagues (2007) showed in a 
comprehensive meta-analysis that high Emotional Stability, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness 
were associated with socio-economic success, lower probability of divorce, and longevity. Although 
they were "not assuming that personality traits are direct causes of the outcomes under study" (p. 
315), they nevertheless used phrases referring to rather explicit causal interpretations throughout the 
paper (e.g., traits "lead to", "affect", "contribute", or "exert their effects"). For instance, they 
suggested that "personality traits lead to divorce or conversely marital stability" because they "help 
shape the quality of long-term relationships" (p. 327). Jokela and colleagues (2014) concluded that 
“low conscientiousness is a potentially important upstream risk factor for developing diabetes” (p. 
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1620). Weston and Jackson (2015) argued that personality traits "may lead to" optimal levels of 
health behaviors such as smoking, drinking and exercise (p. 67), and Hagger-Johnson and 
colleagues (2011) claimed to have demonstrated that "personality [Conscientiousness] and 
individual differences are important determinants [italics mine] of both sexual health behaviors and 
alcohol use prior to and during sexual events" (p. 842).  
To be clear, my intent is not to lament that researchers propose causal interpretations. Instead, 
I simply want to point out that researchers often seem to prefer or gravitate towards interpreting the 
personality trait-outcome associations they observed as causal, even when they—quite rightly—
explicitly acknowledge this goes beyond a strict reading of the data. It is natural to strive towards 
causal explanations, given the reasons of doing this kind of research. 
When are the causal interpretations warranted? 
Correlations are always difficult to interpret. Does x cause y or vice versa? Or is there a (set 
of) variable(s) z that drive(s) both? And can correlational data ever be used for causal inference? 
These questions were addressed in a relatively recent article in this journal (Lee, 2012) along with 
excellent open peer commentary. Here, I argue that the plausibility of any causal interpretation of 
personality trait-outcome associations hinges not just on directionality of influence or effect size but 
also on the plausibility of the underlying idea that traits exist in a holistic form that has causal 
potential.1 
The basis for causal interpretation in personality research 
For a phenomenon to exert some kind of causal force, I argue, it has to have some kind of 
existential reality and coherence. Among other things, this means that particular broad personality 
                                                 
1
 This article is concerned with causal explanations of trait-outcome associations and not merely prediction of 
outcomes from personality traits. Explanation is not necessarily the same thing as prediction. For example, one can 
predict that countries with high self-reported Conscientiousness have low levels of national wealth and low life 
expectancy (Mõttus, Allik, & Realo, 2010), but this does not necessarily mean that high average Conscientiousness is 
involved in making the average person poor or shortening his or her life. In some settings (e.g., organisational or 
clinical contexts), though, mere ability to predict an outcome from personality variables has importance. 
Personality traits and outcomes   7 
traits such as Extraversion and Conscientiousness have to exist independently of how researchers 
have happened to conceive and measure them to warrant being granted causal powers of their own. 
Low Conscientiousness as such can have causal effects on mortality rates only if it is a real human 
attribute that can, at least in some conditions or in some people, initiate the kinds of behaviors or 
biological processes that may eventually shorten life. When I use the term ‘low Conscientiousness 
as such’, or any other trait, I refer to it as a real psychobiological attribute rather than a shorthand 
summary of various behaviors, thoughts, feelings and whatever else that happen to correlate and we 
have decided to use for operationalizing personality. This interpretation of traits corresponds to 
what has been called 'realist ontology' (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003, p. 203). 
Of course, our personality operationalizations and their associations with outcomes are ever 
only models of reality and models are always approximations and abstractions—even when what 
they model is real. But models differ in the levels of concreteness with which they are intended to 
describe tangible reality. Broad personality traits such as those of the FFM are often treated as 
psychological and biological realities that are “in our skins”, quite unlike how one might think of 
some otherwise equally legitimate abstract concepts such as moral consequences of the French 
Revolution. This is exemplified by interpretations of the broad personality traits as ”affecting”, 
“leading to” or being “determinants of” measurable behavior and thereby concrete life outcomes, on 
the basis of observed associations in particular samples of people, as well as by attempts to establish 
their biological basis in people’s brains (e. g., Bjørnebekk et al., 2013; DeYoung, 2015) and 
genomes (e. g., de Moor et al., 2012). The very existence of such research is premised on the belief 
that particular traits exist within individuals' brains. Few would scan people's genomes and brains to 
look for moral consequences of the French Revolution. 
This realist assumption about traits is most naturally consistent with the common-cause latent 
trait interpretation (Borsboom et al., 2003; Markus & Borsboom, 2013). In the psychometric 
framework, such traits are also called ‘reflective’ (Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000). According to this 
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view, traits can be thought of as unobserved 'generators' (underlying common causes) that, perhaps 
in transaction with situational circumstances, produce the observable regularities in behaviors, 
thoughts and feelings that coalesce  as traits. Although the generators may be unobserved and can 
only be inferred from their manifestations (indicators), they exist independently of their observable 
indicators and cause them. It is thus the individual differences in the powers of these generators that 
matter for both individual differences in the observable trait manifestations and the outcomes to 
which the traits are linked: indicators are associated with the outcomes only because they all share 
the same causal input from the underlying generators. A less powerful generator means less of both 
the manifestations and any of the outcomes to which it contributes. John's Extraversion (generator) 
is set at a lower rate than Jane's and therefore he is less likely to attend parties and tends to be less 
talkative in many social settings (manifestations), and if he also has fewer one-night stands 
(outcome) it is possibly his relatively slow generator that contributes to this and not specifically his 
paucity of party attendance or tendency to reticence2. Such traits are holistic in the sense of not 
being reducible to their single manifestations or even their composites. 
Realist common-cause interpretation of traits is common 
Although not all researchers may, at least explicitly, commit to this full exposition of the 
generator interpretation of traits, the general idea appears to be consistent with the default trait 
conceptualization. For example, this view is in line with the influential Five-Factor Theory, which 
conceives traits as “biologically based properties of the individual that affect the rest of the 
personality system, but are not themselves affected by it” (McCrae & Costa, 2008, p. 278). 
Likewise, according to the Cybernetic Big Five Theory (DeYoung, 2015) a personality trait 
corresponds to “the typical functional level of the underlying psychological processes responsible 
for generating the emotional, motivational, cognitive, and behavioral states associated with that 
                                                 
2
 This example illustrates the difficulties related to distinguishing outcomes from the kinds of indicators that we 
often use for operationalizing our purported traits: we could also think of the number of one-night stands as a trait-
indicator and attending parties as an outcome. 
Personality traits and outcomes   9 
trait” (p. 37). Roberts and colleagues (2014) have proposed that Conscientiousness “represents a 
coherent psychobiological construct that influences the multiple facet manifestations” (p. 1318). 
Guillaume-Hanes, Morese and Funder (2012) have said that careful driving and avoiding binge 
drinking are related because they “manifest the same underlying latent trait of Conscientiousness” 
(p. 439).  
For now, I do not challenge this realist interpretation. For the best part of this article, I am 
assuming that we have sufficiently good reasons to believe that, in principle, personality traits as 
such exist and can exert forces outside the personality domain in real and holistic manners. The 
following sections address some of the implications of this assumption. 
What is necessary to have existential and holistic reality and thus causal power? 
When we hypothesize there to be genes, brain correlates or behavioral consequences of 
broadly defined traits, say, Agreeableness or Openness, I maintain that we at least implicitly assume 
the traits to be unitary in both their etiology and any causal forces they exert on other phenomena. 
That is, the ostensible manifestations used to define a purported trait (e.g., its items or facets) have 
to have overlapping causes (e.g., genes or brain correlates) and consequences (e.g., outcome 
correlations), to the extent that they reflect this trait. It would not make much sense to relate scores 
of a purported trait to genes, brain parameters and life outcomes if the trait was actually a collection 
of behaviors, thoughts and feelings that have different causes and exert different kinds of forces. If 
this were the case, it would be more useful to look for the genes, brain correlates or outcome 
correlations of these specific characteristics. In other words, trait scores should be linked with their 
causal factors or consequences in similar ways regardless of the specific observable indicators that 
are used to operationalize them in any given study. Otherwise, it is something specific to trait 
operationalizations that matters, rather than the trait themselves. This corresponds to what 
Spearman (1927) called the theorem of indifference of indicator. Also, the manifestations of 
etiologically unitary traits should display similar developmental trajectories and within-individual 
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fluctuations, and should respond similarly to experimental manipulations, to the extents that they 
reflect the traits (Cattell, 1946). Speaking of Cattell, for him it was exactly the traits with evidence 
for the highest degree of unity that could demonstrate the greatest “usefulness and efficiency in all 
kinds of explanatory and predictive situations” (Cattell, 1946, p. 101). 
This requirement of etiological and causal unity is consistent with the often-used common-
cause latent variable interpretation of traits (Borsboom et al., 2003; Markus & Borsboom, 2013). 
Under this interpretation, unidimensional traits (those reflecting single common causes) exist 
independently of their indicators such as items or facets, so the indicators are exchangeable—at 
least in principle (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). This justifies that researchers use different 
questionnaires and yet claim to have measured the same FFM traits (Pace & Brannick, 2010). 
Individual differences in Extraversion (the generator), for example, could be inferred from 
individual differences either in how talkative and fun-seeking or how assertive and socially 
outgoing people are. No single manifestation is a perfect indicator of its ostensible parent trait 
because the trait is more broadly defined, and any specific manifestation may reflect some other 
sources of substantive variance, in addition to random error. Hence, traits are typically 
operationalized as the common variances of their multiple indicators, assuming that it is these 
common variances that best reflect individual differences in the traits as such. To the extents, then, 
that the indicators largely reflect their ostensible parent traits and that it is indeed the traits as 
defined by these common variances that have particular etiological factors or exert causal forces on 
outcomes, their indicators should display largely similar associations with these etiological factors 
and outcomes—for trait-pertinent causal interpretations to be feasible. 
Of course, not all indicators of a trait need to be correlated with the outcome at hand to 
exactly the same degree. First, indicators can differ in the degree to which they reflect their 
presumed latent parent trait (factor loadings) and the associations between single indicators and 
outcomes should therefore be proportional to factor loadings. Second, indicators may contain 
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specific variance that is correlated with the outcome over and above the variance they share with 
other indicators of the same purported trait. However, to say that it is the trait as such that is 
correlated with the outcome, it seems necessary that most individual indicators have at least some 
above-chance association with the outcome in the same direction. The same logic, of course, applies 
to correlations with factors hypothesized to cause variation in the trait itself. 
Holistic collections of behavioral patterns could exist without common causes 
In principle, of course, one might argue that a collection of behavioral patterns that we have 
labeled a trait, say Neuroticism, consists of a fixed set of irreplaceable constituents, or at least a 
finite list of core constituents. In this case, there would be no inevitable need for a single common 
cause for the inter-correlated manifestations of the trait. For example, McCrae (2015) proposed an 
alternative to the common-cause interpretation of traits by suggesting that traits could be seen as 
unions of their semi-autonomous constituents. In this view, the inter-correlations of trait 
constituents would result from only partly overlapping sets of etiological factors (no etiological 
factor would then pertain to all constituents but only a subset of them, but the subsets would partly 
overlap), and the unique etiological factors would make the constituents partly autonomous. Or, a 
trait could be holistic because its (core) constituents have evolved to work in concert to allow the 
organism to achieve some survival or reproductive purpose. As is the case with common-cause 
latent traits, such a collection of behavioral patterns would not be reducible to any of its single 
constituents nor even their composite. For example, one could draw a parallel with football teams, 
which consist of exactly eleven players with different more or less clearly defined roles, or with 
aircraft, which have a fairly standard set of core features (fuselage, wings, tail, engines etc.) as well 
as numerous optional characteristics. For a football team to be successful, the skills of individual 
players matter, but it is the players’ co-ordinated actions that may matter at least as much or even 
more. Likewise, for an aircraft to fly as intended, its core features have to perform well individually, 
but they also have to work in concert. 
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Would it be possible to say that Neuroticism is defined by a fixed and exhaustive set of k 
(core) items, no more and no less? I am not aware of such claims having been made for personality 
traits. McCrae (2015), who discussed traits as unions of only partly overlapping constituents, also 
appeared cautious on this question. Could it be that Neuroticism is a union of particular constituents 
that have to work in concert, giving the trait emergent properties? I am not aware of such claims 
either. But even if such claims were made and appeared plausible, the requirement of causal unity 
would probably stand, regardless of whether traits are unions due to partly overlapping etiological 
factors of their constituents or because they form some kind of functional unities with emergent 
properties. If only one bit of the union is linked to the outcome, causality pertains to this bit rather 
than the whole, even if this small bit is crucial for the functioning of the whole. 
Hypothetically, suppose that there was evidence that a surge in the failure of a particular core 
feature of aircraft, say landing gear, was linked to the majority of increasingly frequent crash-
landings, regardless of other aircraft characteristics, including their general manufacturers who tend 
to outsource landing gears to independent parts manufacturers. In such instances, one could 
naturally ascribe a relatively higher proportion of causality for the increased accident rate to some 
defect in some aircraft landing gears, as opposed to the aircraft as such or their general 
manufacturers. It would probably not make sense to conclude that some aircraft as such have 
become unsafe overall and need to be redesigned completely, because variability in most of the 
aircraft parts is irrelevant. One could blame aircraft design or those of particular types of aircraft as 
such if the sources of accidents were broader and/or spread across the aircraft features, pointing to 
general assembly problems, for example. Instead, attempts to reinstate flight safety should focus on 
the particular suppliers and/or characteristics of the unsafe landing gears, because some change 
involving them caused the surge of accidents. Also hypothetically, if there was evidence that 
investment in a particular player position on football teams, say, goalkeeper (supposing investment 
reflects players' quality), is correlated with the number of wins teams have, one would naturally 
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consider ascribing a relatively higher proportion of causality for game wins to goalies than to other 
types of players or teams in general. Managers would then be well advised to invest in goalies in 
particular to increase their teams' success rates. 
What does this mean for research programs focused on identifying personality effects on outcomes? 
It is widely acknowledged that broad traits such as those of the FFM are comprised of at least 
somewhat distinguishable components such as aspects (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007) or 
facets (Costa & McCrae, 1992) that reflect additional aspects of personality beyond the extents to 
which they reflect their respective broad traits (usually interpreted as common causes in these 
conceptualizations). And indeed, aspects and (especially) facets are often employed when 
personality-outcome correlations (Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark, & Goldberg, 2005) or age-
differences (Terracciano, McCrae, Brant, & Costa, 2005) in personality traits are investigated, 
although little to no attention is typically paid to the associations at the level of the items that make 
up the traits, aspects and facets. But even if aspect- or facet-level associations are reported, the 
theoretical implications of such analyses for causal interpretations are rarely discussed (one attempt 
to do this can be found in Judge, Rodell, Klinger, Simon, & Crawford, 2013). For example, suppose 
that only a subset of facets of an FFM trait is linked to an outcome, but this subset also makes the 
FFM trait—the sum score to which these facets contribute—appear correlated with it. This is not a 
rare occurrence in existent literature, as will be noted below. In such a case, I maintain, there is 
unlikely to be sufficient evidence to conclude that it is the FFM trait as such that is linked to the 
outcome, and it is even less likely that it is the FFM trait that has some causal impact on the 
outcome.  
I argue that whenever a trait, whether measured as a latent variable or a sum score, is linked to 
an outcome, consistency of the associations among the items and, where available, facets of the 
trait-operationalization should be tested. Moreover, I argue that the results of these analyses should 
be interpreted in light of their theoretical implications for the nature of the observed associations. If 
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the associations are consistent across items and facets, they are more likely to pertain to the trait: 
this a necessary, although not a sufficient, precondition for causal interpretation (e.g., this does not 
say anything about the directionality of the association). In contrast, if the associations are specific 
to only some items or facets, then they are unlikely to pertain to the trait and would be more 
appropriately interpreted as pertaining to the (unique) variance of the specific items or facets 
involved. Such sensitivity analyses should not be considered bonuses to trait-level analyses, but as 
essential requirements for making the trait-level analyses interpretable. Simply reporting FFM trait-
outcome correlations is not sufficient, in my view.  
Such sensitivity analyses should also be carried out when trait scores are linked with potential 
causal sources such as genetic variants, brain parameters, or demographic variables. For example, 
we systematically compared the developmental trajectories of the facets of the same FFM traits and 
items of the same FFM facets and found that facets of all traits and items of all facets varied 
significantly in how they were correlated with age (Mõttus et al., 2015). This pointed to the 
possibility that different causal forces acted upon different aspects of the same traits and facets to 
varying degrees throughout the lifespan, calling their coherence and existential realism into 
question. 
Samples of people and samples of stimuli 
My argument for causal unity of traits in relation to outcomes (or etiological unity in relation 
to the possible causes of trait-variation, for that matter) is consistent with a recent discussion of 
interpretation problems in experimental studies (Westfall, Judd, & Kenny, 2015; Judd, Westfall, & 
Kenny, 2012). In particular, these authors noted that experimental research often fails to take into 
account stimulus variation—that the stimuli used in studies are never perfect exemplars or 
operationalizations of the underlying constructs of interest. In many cases, stimuli (e.g., 
photographs shown or words presented in an experiment) should be considered potentially 
interchangeable, drawn from theoretically appropriate populations of relevant stimuli—exactly as 
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we think of participants. Failure to consider and empirically address this requirement may lead to 
incorrect conclusions in situations where observed associations are specific to particular stimuli 
chosen to operationalize the phenomena of interest. To prevent this, Westfall and colleagues 
(Westfall, Judd, & Kenny, 2015; Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012) proposed treating experimental 
stimuli as random rather than fixed factors and employing appropriate mixed-effect modeling 
approaches. 
Analogously, we can think of personality test items and perhaps facets as stimulus material. 
Just as analogously, then, we should treat them as random and interchangeable samples from the 
corresponding universes of theoretically appropriate stimuli. For example, given some existentially 
and holistically real latent Neuroticism trait, for example, the 48 items of the Neuroticism scale of 
the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI; Costa & McCrae, 1992) are probably not the 
only possible 48 indicators of Neuroticism as it occurs in nature: they only comprise a sample of 
items measuring this ostensible underlying trait. Indeed, other FFM scales include different items 
for measuring the same construct (Goldberg, 1999). No sample of indicators perfectly reflects the 
intended trait as such, but we should do our best to ensure as good an approximation as possible and 
a viable way to do this is to compare results based on different samples of indicators. 
Existing evidence 
Because researchers rarely report item-level correlations, it is difficult to estimate to what 
degree trait-outcome associations tend to be consistent across the items used for operationalizing 
traits. One exception is the study of Terracciano and colleagues (2009), who reported that although 
the Impulsiveness facet of the NEO-PI had the strongest link with high body mass index (BMI), the 
association was driven by only the two items of the facet scale that specifically referred to over-
eating. That is, had the NEO-PI constructors not chosen to include two eating items in the 
Impulsiveness scale, its scores would probably not have been associated with being overweight. 
Although Terracciano and colleagues “adopted the perspective that personality traits influence 
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anthropometric values” (p. 687), it seems only too likely that at least for Impulsiveness it was not 
the broadly construed construct as such but more specifically tending to eat too much that was the 
correlate and thereby possibly a causal factor of high BMI. Similar findings were reported by Vainik 
and colleagues (2015). However, other studies that have reported associations between the 
Impulsiveness scale and BMI (e.g., Sutin, Ferrucci, Zonderman, & Terracciano, 2011; Sutin et al., 
2013) have failed to address item-level correlations, which renders interpretations of their findings 
ambiguous, given the results of these other studies. 
Similarly, Gale and colleagues (submitted for publication) reported cross-sectional 
associations between the FFM traits and frailty in a large sample of Britons aged between 60 and 90 
years. Conceptually, frailty reflects decreases in resistance to stressors and ability to maintain 
homeostasis in older age. In this study, it was indexed as a composite of 44 items measuring various 
aspects of health, as well as sensory and cognitive functioning. Lower Extraversion and 
Conscientiousness were associated with higher frailty scores, but the association with Extraversion 
was entirely driven by two items referring to being 'active' and 'lively', and the association with 
Conscientiousness pertained to a large extent (but not completely) to an item referring to 'hard-
working'. In this case, it was not particularly meaningful to conclude that frailty was linked with 
Extraversion as such —it was more likely linked with the variance in being active and lively that 
was not shared with the other indicators of Extraversion. 
Of course, in many—perhaps even most—instances the outcome associations do generalize 
across items of their respective scales, making it more likely that they pertain to the shared variance 
of trait indicators and thereby to the traits as such. But this needs to be demonstrated and not 
assumed. For example, Vainik and colleagues (2015) found that the associations of the 
Assertiveness and Order facets of the NEO-PI with BMI generalized across all items of the scales. 
Perhaps importantly, however, these are facets rather than any of the broad FFM traits, and they are 
not even considered facets of the same broad traits. This suggests that the associations could not be 
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generalized to the two relevant FFM traits. 
Relative consistency of facets-within-trait associations with outcomes can also be evaluated, 
if facets are measured. To the extent the FFM traits have existential and holistic realism in the sense 
of causing rather than summarizing the observable and inter-correlated behaviors, thoughts and 
feelings, they should also exist independently of which particular set of facets researchers have 
carved out for them. To the best of my knowledge, no one has made a case that the six, say, 
Extraversion facets of the NEO-PI exhaust the theoretical population of facets for this trait. But 
even more importantly, if FFM traits were sums rather than causes of their constituent facets (i.e., 
formative traits; Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000), then it is the latter that would take causal priority. 
Given this, save for variability in the degree to which facets reflect their parent FFM traits (i.e., 
factor loadings), they should have similar correlations with outcomes, if it is the FFM traits as such 
and not the unique variance in facets that are linked with the outcome at hand. The incremental 
value of facets must lie in their unique variance on top of common trait-variance rather than in 
facets defining identifiably separable components of the traits.  
There is considerable evidence that different facets of the FFM traits can have quite different 
correlations with outcomes, sometimes even in opposite directions. Because the factor loadings of 
facets are not typically reported, it is difficult to judge to what degree differences in how the facets 
reflect their parent FFM traits can account for this variability, though presumably this would never 
account for associations running in different directions. As with items, BMI has shown different 
associations with the facets of particular FFM traits. For example, although high BMI was 
correlated with high Neuroticism in Sutin and colleagues' (2011) study, this association was driven 
by only the Impulsiveness facet of the trait; and based on the above-discussed evidence from other 
studies, even this association could have been specific to the two eating-related items of the scale, 
though this was not addressed there. Likewise, the facets of Conscientiousness differed in their links 
with BMI, to the extent that they were in different directions (Sutin et al., 2013, 2011). Observations 
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that different facets of the same FFM trait had very different and sometimes even opposing outcome 
associations or that the apparent associations were driven by only a few facets of the trait have also 
been reported for other outcomes. Some relevant examples include job-performance (Judge et al., 
2013; Tett, Steele, & Beauregard, 2003), antisocial behavior (Corff & Toupin, 2009), dietary habits 
(Mõttus, Realo, Allik, Deary, et al., 2012), smoking cessation (Fernández del Río et al., 2015), 
consumer behavior (Otero-López & Villardefrancos Pol, 2013), sexually transmitted disease 
(Mõttus, Realo, Allik, Esko, & Metspalu, 2012), relationship status and quality (Noftle & Shaver, 
2006), and life-satisfaction (Marrero Quevedo & Carballeira Abella, 2011). It may well be that in 
many, if not most, instances the variability in outcome associations is due to variability in factor 
loadings, but this needs to be tested. 
How to investigate variability in indicator-outcome correlations? 
The easiest way to investigate variability in how indicators (items or facets) of a trait are 
linked to an outcome is to eyeball item- or facet-level correlations. If only a subset of items or 
facets of a scale are linked to the outcome at hand, and especially if the associations run in different 
directions, it is not likely that the trait as such is involved in the association.  
Another rule of thumb is that none of the items or facets should have a stronger correlation 
with the outcome than their parent trait, at least when the association is driven primarily by the trait. 
This is because, theoretically, items and facets are only imperfect indicators of their parent traits. 
For example, if a latent Conscientiousness variable correlates .25 with variability in income and the 
item “I am self-disciplined” has a loading of .50 on the latent trait, then the item should have a 
correlation of at most .25 * .50 = .125 with income. If, however, this single item has a notably 
higher correlation with income, then it is possible or even likely that the trait-outcome correlation of 
.25 is largely driven or at least notably inflated by this single, supposed-to-be-exchangeable item. 
To the extent that there is concern that a trait-outcome association may be driven or inflated 
by specific individual indicators of the trait, it would be natural to drop these indicators and 
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recalculate the association. If the association remains similar, there is no reason to be further 
concerned. If the association is remarkably diminished, but still observable beyond what is likely 
due to chance, it should be interpreted as having been inflated by the specific trait indicators. If the 
association vanishes altogether, then it most likely pertained to these specific indicators and not to 
the trait itself.  
Of course, dropping indicators from trait operationalizations may entail reductions of 
reliability, which also tends to weaken observable trait-outcome associations. It is therefore 
advisable to replace the dropped indicators with alternative indicators. One way to do this is to start 
with larger samples of indicators than is strictly necessary for sufficiently reliable measurement of 
the trait and draw different samples of indicators from these larger indicator populations, aggregate 
them and calculate their associations with outcomes. If a correlation pertains to the underlying trait, 
it should remain relatively similar across different draws of indicators. It is often possible to apply 
this approach to already-collected data. For example, the NEO-PI measures each FFM trait with 48 
items—probably more than is necessary for reliably measuring a trait. It is therefore possible to 
draw samples of, say, 10 to 20 items from among the 48 and calculate the correlations of the 
resulting scales with the outcomes at hand. Mõttus and colleagues (2015) applied this approach to 
investigate the associations of FFM traits with age and found that the correlations varied 
substantially across scales comprising different draws of items of the same traits. Another way to 
sample different items for measuring the same underlying trait is to administer in parallel two 
questionnaires purportedly measuring this trait—e.g., the NEO-PI and IPIP (Goldberg, 1999)—and 
compare trait-outcome-correlations across the questionnaires. 
Admittedly, there are too few appropriate formal methods for testing whether the associations 
of traits with outcomes are independent of which indicators are employed rather than being specific 
to particular indicators. Vainik and colleagues (2015) developed a formal procedure based on the 
idea of systematically dropping trait indicators and recalculating the associations. Another formal 
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method for testing the causal unity of traits is to use random effects models and treat indicators as 
random factors, as suggested by Judd and colleagues (2012). However, neither of these methods 
may efficiently account for variability in indicators' factor loadings. Therefore, attempts to develop 
more refined formal tests of causal unity of traits should be strongly encouraged. 
Risk of triviality 
In instances where observed trait-outcome associations appear specific to particular 
indicators, I claim that they should not be interpreted as pertaining to the traits as such. Instead, the 
associations should be interpreted as pertaining to the specific constituents of the trait-
operationalizations (indicators) that display the associations. However, sometimes these 
associations may be so specific as to be trivial or tautological. For example, if we find out that only 
those items of Neuroticism in general, and its Impulsiveness facet in particular, that directly refer to 
eating too much correlate with being overweight, this may not do much to improve our 
understanding of either personality or obesity. Likewise, finding out that the associations of 
Extraversion with well-being, life-satisfaction and happiness are to notable extents driven by the 
items of the Extraversion scale that directly refer to experiencing positive emotions (Marrero 
Quevedo & Carballeira Abella, 2011; Schimmack, Oishi, Furr, & Funder, 2004) may seem 
somewhat tautological. But so be it. There is no point in generalizing associations to levels of the 
trait-hierarchy to which they do not appear to apply, given the evidence at hand.  
What if traits do not have existential realism to start with? 
The requirement that trait-outcome associations be independent of how the trait happens to be 
operationalized in any given study only applies when we assume that traits should take some real 
and holistic form. Perhaps some researchers do not assume that personality traits such those of the 
FFM are real psychobiological attributes that either exist independently of their operationalizations 
or are some kind of natural unions of their exhaustive sets of (core) features. Perhaps they interpret 
trait scores as aggregates of researcher-chosen constituents (e.g., Cramer et al., 2012; Wood, 
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Gardner, & Harms, 2015). For example, traits may be otherwise artificial constructions that serve 
only our practical research or assessment purposes such as summarizing individual differences 
succinctly (for a related discussion with respect to psychiatric disorders, see Kendler, Zachar, and 
Craver, 2011). If so, attributing causality to traits as such seems equally questionable regardless of 
whether their constituents have similar or different associations with the outcome at hand. Even if 
the associations generalize across trait constituents, causal interpretations may be more fruitfully 
based on these constituents rather than the summary-level traits. 
To see why, it might be instructive to draw a parallel with socioeconomic status (SES), which 
could be defined as a composite score of educational level, income, occupational status and the 
quality of one's residence, for example. All of these constituents of SES tend to be inter-correlated 
and this composite, as well as similar others, have many well-known associations with important 
life outcomes (e.g., Mackenbach et al., 2008). Yet it would be presumptuous to assume that this is 
because these constituents come together from some common set of causes to create some kind of 
existentially and holistically real entity (the generator) that can in turn exert causal forces on all the 
associates of SES. There may be no existentially real SES-attribute on which people differ and 
which causes them to graduate from good schools, obtain prestigious jobs, earn high salaries and 
live in nice neighborhoods full of large, expensive homes.  
I do realize that some may propose, say, intelligence or perhaps some parental characteristic 
as the common cause of SES indicators. In my view, however, it is at least equally plausible that the 
situation is more complex than that. I suspect that a good education, which is indeed predictable 
from pre-existing intelligence as well as parental education, helps one to obtain a prestigious job, 
most of which also bring rather high income and thereby ability to purchase a comfortable home in 
a good neighborhood, and most people indeed put reasonably high proportions of their financial 
resources into their homes, as well as tending to prefer to live among neighbors rather similar to 
themselves in income and education. Yes, high intelligence may provide extra help at every stage, 
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but it may also be itself boosted and/or maintained by the characteristics used to define the attained 
SES such as educational and occupational levels (Deary & Johnson, 2010; Ritchie, Bates, Der, 
Starr, & Deary, 2013). But it may sometimes also be that, despite their inter-correlation, each of 
these constituents substantively adds its own independent variance to what we consider SES. For 
example, sports champions and movie stars often earn very high incomes and have high social 
prestige, but may not be particularly well educated. And extremely highly-educated university 
professors do not tend to make anywhere near as much money as sports champions and movie stars, 
or even American football coaches at the same universities. Now, if SES actually coalesces due to 
causal links among its constituents or is a mere sum of these, it is not straightforward to interpret it 
as a cause of its associated outcomes—even if all the constituents of the SES operationalizations 
track with them in similar ways. This is because SES itself is then the result rather than the cause of 
its constituents and, unless it takes on emergent properties, it thereby owes its outcome correlations 
to these constituents.  
If SES itself is not directly causal for either of these reasons, why, then, might low SES be 
associated with diabetes, for example? It seems possible that some of its constituents such as, 
perhaps most prominently, low educational attainment and income, along with whatever upstream 
antecedents these may have (e.g., intelligence; Mõttus, Luciano, Starr, & Deary, 2013), can 
contribute to diabetes. This may happen, for example, via poor uptake of knowledge about health 
management, treatment, and early disease symptoms; greater exposure to stressful conditions; and 
limited access to resources that would help to sustain healthy lifestyle and effectively manage the 
precursors and symptoms of the condition.3 
                                                 
3
 Lutfey and Freese (2005) discuss SES as being the 'fundamental cause' of health outcomes such as diabetes. In 
their treatment, SES-outcome associations refer to large and persistent collections of pathways that link the constituents 
of SES to a variety of aspects of the outcomes (e.g., aspects of diabetes etiology and management). It is exactly the 
multiplicity and thereby persistence of the pathways that makes the role of SES in outcomes fundamental: such 
associations are extremely hard to break by knocking out single or a few pathways between SES and outcome 
constituents—there are simply too many of them and they tend to reproduce. It is not clear, however, to which extent 
one really needs to evoke SES as such for the causal explanations. It is possible that many of these multiple pathways 
that Lutfey and Freese (2005) discuss as linking SES to its associated outcomes are reducible to some particular 
Personality traits and outcomes   23 
If one also interprets personality traits such as Conscientiousness as collections of 
etiologically and functionally autonomous behaviors, thoughts and feelings—albeit still often inter-
correlated to varying degrees4, perhaps due to direct causal inter-relations with each other (Cramer 
et al., 2012) or due to shared functional values (Wood et al., 2015)—then their associations with 
outcomes could arise in analogous ways. Perhaps it is the specific constituents of our 
operationalizations of Conscientiousness that individually and thus cumulatively contribute to the 
kinds processes that help some people live longer. Having the habit of carefully checking for 
approaching cars before crossing the road and not exceeding the speed limit (possible constituents 
of NEO-PI Deliberation and Dutifulness facets) may decrease the likelihood of being involved in a 
traffic accident, whereas having enough self-discipline and organization skills (possible constituents 
of NEO-PI Self-Discipline and Order facets) for continuously exercising and monitoring diet may 
help maintain better metabolic state. These behaviors are likely to be inter-correlated, which may at 
least in part be due to serving the same purpose—a decision to take care of one's health and safety, 
for example, which would then be more appropriate to consider an underlying ‘cause’ of longevity. 
Yet making the bed in the morning or putting dirty clothes in a hamper may not be directly related 
to longevity, let alone cause it, even if they correlate with exercising and dieting (and thereby 
indirectly with road-checking and sensible driving), because they all contribute towards the 
common purpose of pleasing one's partner, for example. For a thoughtful treatment of these 
questions, refer to Wood and colleagues (2015). 
                                                                                                                                                                  
constituents of SES such as, most likely, education and income (and their more distal precursors such as intelligence, for 
example). If so, SES itself may again be little more than a shorthand summary of numerous causal agents rather than the 
cause itself. Importantly, the SES-outcome associations would still need to be similarly observable across most of the 
pathways linking the constituents of both (Lutfey & Freese, 2005). Also importantly, it may be possible to break the 
SES-health associations after all: there is some evidence that the SES-mental health links can be persistently weakened 
in children by quasi-experimentally increasing just one of the SES constituents—family income (Costello, Erkanli, 
Copeland, & Angold, 2010). 
4
 Note that the correlations among the items of the same FFM domains are typically relatively modest, with 
average correlations ranging somewhere from .10 to .20 or slightly higher. With 48 items, these average inter-item 
correlations result in impressive internal consistency estimates (Cronbach's alphas) of .84 and .92 or higher, however. 
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Some further considerations 
Traits need to be defined independently of their mediators 
Simply documenting an association between a broad personality trait and an outcome may not 
be sufficient. Findings that Agreeableness correlates negatively with having a criminal record 
(Mõttus, Guljajev, Allik, Laidra, & Pullmann, 2012) or Conscientiousness correlates with brain 
integrity (Booth et al., 2014) have to be furnished with more specific mechanisms, either if these 
associations are to be used for attempts to reduce antisocial behavior or improve brain health, or for 
understanding how exactly personality exerts its influence on other life domains. It may be tempting 
to work out the mediating mechanisms by identifying the specific contents of personality scales that 
correlate with the outcomes particularly highly. For example, one may hypothesize that low NEO-
PI Conscientiousness predicts high BMI because people low on this trait have limited self-discipline 
and are not well organized (Sutin et al., 2011), and thus they manifest this by not keeping good 
track of what they eat, scheduling in time for exercise, or monitoring their weight. On one hand, this 
reasoning seems to make perfect sense: low Conscientiousness is causal to its manifestations such 
as low self-discipline and lack of orderliness, which in turn cause some proximal factors 
contributing to being overweight. On the other hand, though, this reasoning runs the risk of being 
tautological. This is because self-discipline and orderliness are not logically independent from 
Conscientiousness: the trait has been in part operationalized using these proposed mediators. It is 
only when the potential mediators are dropped from the trait operationalizations that the proposed 
mediation pathways become more plausible. However, it seems all too likely that when these 
mediator-candidates are dropped from trait operationalizations, the trait-outcome links are 
substantially weakened or may sometimes vanish altogether. 
Traits should exist independently of outcomes 
A requirement for a good explanation is that the phenomenon being explained (explanandum) 
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be conceptually distinct from the phenomena that are used for the explanation (explanans). 
Therefore, outcomes have to be conceptually distinct from traits. This requirement may not always 
be met in studies examining trait-outcome associations. 
Sometimes, the conceptual overlap between traits and outcomes is obvious. For example, 
consider personality traits such as Neuroticism and Extraversion on one hand and happiness and 
well-being on the other. Feeling positive emotions is part of how Extraversion is defined and 
measured in the FFM (e.g., the Positive Emotions facet of Extraversion in the NEO-PI; Costa & 
McCrae, 1992) and lack of positive feelings is also an integral part of being unhappy. It is therefore 
not surprising that low scores on the Depression and high scores on the Positive Emotion facets are 
the most consistent correlates of well-being and happiness, among the facets of Neuroticism and 
Extraversion, respectively (Marrero Quevedo & Carballeira Abella, 2011; Schimmack et al., 2004). 
Or, consider the similarity between the items “I like most aspects of my personality” and “In 
general, I feel I am in charge of the situation in which I live” of the Scales of Psychological Well-
Being (Ryff & Keyes, 1995) and, respectively, the items “I have a low opinion of myself” and 
“Sometimes things look pretty bleak and hopeless to me” of the Depression facet of the NEO-PI. 
Both of these measures were included in a meta-analysis concluding that there are both direct and 
indirect associations between personality traits with subjective well-being and that “long-term 
happiness is largely contingent on internal characteristics” (Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008, p. 151). 
At other times, the overlap may be more subtle. In a sense, at least some personality ratings 
may have broad life outcomes such as educational and occupational success built right into them. 
Personality traits broadly summarize what people do and so do the outcomes. For example, getting 
ahead in academia or advancing one's career often require being hard-working, dutiful, orderly and 
deliberate across a range of circumstances as well as being perceived as such by self and others—
the very same characteristics that Conscientiousness items are likely to reflect and/or people are 
likely to think about as they respond to these items. In some ways, a comprehensive personality test 
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is a little model of life as the respondent is perceived living it. Therefore, some overlap between 
broad personality trait scores and the life outcomes is almost guaranteed by definition. Of course, 
this does not apply when personality ratings are obtained before the outcomes could influence them. 
Moreover, some more specific outcomes may be parts of how personality traits are defined or 
be the specific behaviors people think about when rating the traits. For example, consider the 
relation between dietary habits and Openness. Part of the definition of the trait is being willing to 
try new things, and trying food items that are not part of the typical local diet is one of the ways that 
people can try new things. In fact, a NEO-PI Openness item explicitly asks about diet (“I often try 
new and foreign foods”). As a result, it is perhaps rather unsurprising that there is evidence for a 
small correlation between Openness and adherence to less common types of diet (Mõttus, Realo, 
Allik, Deary, et al., 2012). Likewise, physical activity is part of the definition of Extraversion (e.g., 
several of the NEO-PI Extraversion items address being active and having an active life-style, such 
as “I am a very active person”), which may contribute to the correlation between them (Rhodes & 
Smith, 2006).  
Sometimes, it may be possible to reduce or completely remove direct trait-outcome overlap 
by skimming through personality test items and omitting ones that either clearly refer to the 
outcome at hand or that may inspire reflection on the outcome from statistical analyses. When this 
is not possible but there are still reasons to suspect some conceptual overlap between traits and 
outcomes, it may be advisable to factor this into interpretations of the associations. For example, it 
may be tautological to glorify broad personality traits because they correlate with some broad life 
outcomes when the trait operationalizations consist of behaviors directly required to achieve these 
outcomes, or when the trait ratings may in part reflect the very outcomes themselves. It would be 
surprising, one may argue, if summaries of what people have done (outcomes) did not correlate in 
some ways with summaries of what people say they typically do (personality test scores).  
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Implications for traits 
The extent to which broad traits display causal unity or fail to do so may have implications for 
their very nature. In particular, apparent causal unity would be consistent with traits having 
existential realism and being the kinds of generators posited by latent trait model. In contrast, 
widespread evidence that constituents of the operationalizations of broad traits show variability in 
links with outcome variables beyond variability in factor loadings would not be consistent with 
traits being causally and thereby existentially unitary, at least in the latent common-cause trait 
sense. 
Conclusion 
My main arguments in this article were as follows. First, I argued that, for the purposes for 
which personality traits are often linked with outcome variables—to substantiate traits and explain 
outcomes, and especially when hoping to develop interventions to change the outcomes—the 
associations need to be capable of being interpreted in causal terms. Indeed, causal interpretations 
are widespread in the literature, although most researchers do acknowledge, often in cautionary 
notes restricted to study limitations sections, that their analyses do not fully justify these 
interpretations. Second, I argued that causal interpretations require traits to have existential realism 
and holism. Indeed, broad traits such as those of the FFM are often assumed to have such 
properties. Third, I argued that, for the causal interpretations to be possible, traits have to display 
evidence of causal unity: constituents of trait-operationalizations (or trait-indicators) have to be 
linked with outcomes in similar ways, save for variability in factor loadings. In other words, the 
associations should not depend on how traits happen to be operationalized. Fourth, I argued that 
such causal unity can be and should be tested in each and every study that seeks to link personality 
traits with outcomes, although formal methodology for doing this robustly requires further 
development. Existing evidence suggests that observed associations between, for example, FFM 
traits and outcomes at least sometimes depend on which particular constituents have been included 
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in trait-operationalizations, pointing to potential lack of causal unity of the FFM trait and thereby 
calling causal interpretations into question. However, this has rarely been explicitly considered in 
the literature so far. I thus call for greater theoretical and methodological rigor when linking 
personality traits with outcomes and provide one conceptual framework for doing so. 
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